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Gary Thomas Allen murdered his girlfriend, LaWanna Gail Tit-
sworth, by shooting four bullets into her body.1 Forrest Kinzer Wade
murdered Gary Chapman by striking him in the head with a hammer,
and murdered Johnny Brewer by eviscerating him with a butcher
knife 2 Maximo Lee Salazar murdered nine year old Jennifer Prill by
stabbing her twice in the neck while burglarizing her home.3 Scott
Allen Hain murdered Laura Lee Sanders and Michael Houghton by
locking them in the trunk of Sanders' car and setting the car on fire.4
Allen, Wade, Salazar, and Hain were subsequently arrested and each
was charged with First Degree Murder.5
At the time each of these crimes was committed, the penalty for
first degree murder, as set forth in section 701.9 of the Oklahoma
Criminal Code, was either life imprisonment or death.6 On November
1, 1987, while all four defendants were awaiting trial, an amendment
to section 701.9 became effective that added the sentencing option of
life without parole.7
Without considering the option of life without parole, a jury sub-
sequently convicted all four defendants of First Degree Murder and
1. Allen v. State, 821 P.2d 371, 373 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
2. Wade v. State, 825 P.2d 1357, 1359-60 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
3. Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 731 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
4. Hain v. State, 852 P.2d 744, 746-47 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1402, and cerL denied, 114 S. Ct. 1416 (1994). Robert Wayne Lambert was a co-defendant and
tried in a separate case. See Lambert v. State, 808 P.2d 72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
5. Hain, 852 P.2d at 746; Salazar, 852 P.2d at 731; Wade, 825 P.2d at 1359; Allen, 821 P.2d
at 372. Hain, Salazar, and Allen were also charged with and convicted of other crimes, but for
present purposes, only the murder charges will be discussed.
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.9 (1981), amended by 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 96 (current ver-
sion at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.9 (1991)).
7. 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 96 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.11, .15
(1991 & Supp. 1994)).
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sentenced them to death.8 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals9 upheld all four murder convictions, but vacated each death sen-
tence and remanded for resentencing; holding in each case that the
trial court erred by not considering the option of life without parole as
added by the November 1987 amendment.10
Although the court addressed other issues related to the sentenc-
ing phase of the trials,1' the primary basis for its decision in all four
cases was the distinction set forth in Allen, i.e., the sentencing amend-
ment was procedural and not substantive. 2 The Allen court held that,
because the amendment did not affect the maximum or minimum
punishment to which Allen could have been subjected, it did not alter
the punishment beyond that which was in effect at the time of the
crime, and therefore, the amendment was procedural and not substan-
tive.' 3 In the court's view, this distinction permitted retroactive appli-
cation of the amendment without violating the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws' 4 and avoided the saving
8. Hain, 852 P.2d at 746; Salazar, 852 P.2d at 731; Wade, 825 P.2d at 1359; Allen, 821 P.2d
at 372.
9. The Oklahoma Supreme Court does not hear criminal cases. The Court of Criminal
Appeals is the highest state court which hears criminal cases. See OaA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
10. Hain, 852 P.2d at 753; Salazar, 852 P.2d at 741; Wade, 825 P.2d at 1363; Allen, 821 P.2d
at 376.
11. In Hain, the court considered the need for careful scrutiny of a death sentence, princi-
ples of fairness, and the proximity of the time of the crime to the legislative enactment. Hain,
852 P.2d at 753.
The court in Salazar addressed the applicability of 1) Oklahoma's savings clause; 2) the
"death is different" analysis, which proposes that, because a death sentence is different from any
other type of punishment, there is a heightened need for care to ensure that the sentence of
death is not imposed capriciously; and 3) the legislative purpose for enacting the amendment.
See discussion infra part IV.A; Salazar, 852 P.2d at 738-39; see also id. at 741 n.9 (noting that the
requirement of waiver was not overruled, although Salazar did not make such a waiver. The
court further commented that the district court, the district attorney, and Salazar were all under
the mistaken impression that life without parole was not an option during sentencing, and the
right against ex post facto application was therefore not waived because the defendant did not
know he had that right).
Wade, 825 P.2d at 1363 (noting that the defendant specifically waived his constitutional right
against application of any ex post facto law and holding that failure of the trial court to instruct
the jury on the possibility of life without parole would not have been error without this waiver);
Allen, 821 P.2d at 375-76 (considering possible ex post facto violations by retroactive application
of the amendment, and appropriate remedies upon a finding of error).
12. Allen, 821 P.2d at 376.
13. Id. at 375-376; see also Hain, 852 P.2d at 753; Salazar, 852 P.2d at 737; Wade, 825 P.2d at
1363.
14. U.S. COrs-r. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (stating, while referring to the Congress of the United
States, that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1 (stating that "[n]o State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility"); OKLA. CoNSr. art. II,
§ 15 (stating that "[nio bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of
contracts, shall ever be passed").
2
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clause 15 contained in the Oklahoma Constitution. 6 However, judicial
designation of a statutory amendment as procedural, thereby allowing
retroactive application, is not necessarily sufficient to overcome con-
stitutional provisions. Retroactive application of the 1987 amendment
may indeed be ex post facto, and it raises equal protection 17 concerns.
Furthermore, retroactive application ignores both Oklahoma's saving
clause and legislative intent.
This comment examines these constitutional issues as well as the
process of determining legislative intent, and the interaction between
such issues and retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal
statute.' 8 The foregoing capital cases will be used for illustration;
however, the discussion will be equally applicable to any change in a
criminal statute.' 9 It will be demonstrated that a court cannot avoid
these constitutional provisions by simply designating a new -or
amended criminal statute as procedural. Finally, the comment will an-
alyze the practical effects of retroactive application, and conclude that
enactments which amend or repeal criminal statutes should only apply
prospectively.20
15. A saving clause is any statutory or constitutional language which "saves" a pending
prosecution from abatement upon the repeal or amendment of the underlying statute. BLAcK's
LAW DIcrIONARY 1343 (6th ed. 1990); see also discussion infra part IV.A.
16. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 54; see also discussion infra part IV.A.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws").
18. This comment will not consider implications of retroactivity concerning constitutional
repeal by the legislature nor judicial decisions which affect the constitutionality of criminal laws.
For a discussion of the former, see United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934). For a discus-
sion of the latter, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Paul Bender, The Retroactive
Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision- Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. Ruv. 650 (1962);
Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and Judicial
Practice (with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases), 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 1046 (1994); Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in
the Federal Courts, 71 YALE LJ. 907 (1962).
Although this comment does focus on four death penalty cases, it is not intended to repre-
sent a position for or against imposition of the death penalty.
19. The discussion concerning amendment or repeal of statutes involving the death penalty
will not, of course, apply to other criminal statutes which are not punishable by death. However,
much of the discussion contained in the opinions is applicable to other amendments. For exam-
ple, the discussion of procedural classification, legislative intent, saving clauses, ex post facto
laws, and equal protection is applicable to any amendment or enactment of a criminal statute.
20. When a statute is declared unconstitutional, the issue of retroactivity is generally one of
degree rather than whether it should be applied at all. The United States Supreme Court has
wrestled with retroactivity in such cases, and has yet to set forth any clear guidelines for deter-
mining the degree of retroactivity which should be allowed in particular types of cases. In fact,
the degree of retroactivity seems to be case-specific. See, e.g., Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S.
831 (1969) (allowing retroactivity only for those defendants whose guilty pleas were accepted
after a certain date); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (limiting retroactivity to cases
in which an electronic surveillance conductd after a certain date is attempted to be introduced
3
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II. PROCEDURAL V. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Procedural law, in a criminal context, is generally considered to
be law which creates or regulates the steps by which a criminal de-
fendant is to be punished,2 ' or the rules governing the procedures for
investigating, prosecuting, adjudicating, and punishing crimes.22 Sub-
stantive law is law that specifies which acts constitute criminal behav-
ior and prescribes the punishment thereafter.3 The United States
Supreme Court has stated that the term "procedural" refers to
changes in the procedures for adjudicating a criminal case, as opposed
to changes in the substantive law of crimes.24
In Oklahoma, the substantive law of crimes, or penal law, 2 is in
Title 21, formally known as the Penal Code,26 and the law of criminal
procedure is in Title 22.27 The sentencing amendment at issue in
Hain, Salazar, Wade, and Allen, is contained in Title 21.2 It is not at
all clear how the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that a provi-
sion contained in the substantive law of crimes should be classified as
procedural without a corresponding statement of legislative intent.29
into evidence); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (holding that the exclusionary rule would
only be applicable to trials in which the evidence is introduced after a certain date); DeStefano v.
Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (allowing retroactivity only in trials begun after a certain date);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (providing for retroactivity only in those cases involving
confrontation for identification purposes, conducted in the absence of counsel, and after a spe-
cific date); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 618 (1965) (holding that retroactivity would not be allowed in
state court convictions which had become final before a certain date); see also Ronald Elliot
Metter, Comment, Partial Retroactivity: A Question of Equal Protection, 43 TEMP, L.Q. 239
(1970) (providing a more extensive discussion of these cases).
21. State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969); State v. Augustine, 416 P.2d 281, 283
(Kan. 1966); State v. Davis, 483 A.2d 740, 743 (Me. 1984); see also 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 2
(1989).
22. BLAcK's LAW DITmONARY 374 (6th ed. 1990).
23. Gaspin v. State, 45 S.E.2d 785, 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947); State v. Elmore, 155 So. 896,
897-98 (La. 1934); see also 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 2 (1989).
24. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990).
25. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "penal law" as "[s]tatutes that
define criminal offenses and specify corresponding fines and punishment").
26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 2 (1991) (providing that "[n]o act or omission shall be deemed
criminal or punishable except as prescribed or authorized by this code. The words 'this code' as
used in the 'penal code' shall be construed to mean 'statutes of this State"').
27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1-2002 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
28. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.11, .15 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
29. See 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 96 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.11,
.15 (1991 & Supp. 1994)) (containing no plain language statement of the intent of the
legislature).
In Oklahoma, there is very little documentation of legislative history, and unfortunately, the
legislature did not record any indication of its intent with regard to this amendment. Generally,
where the legislature has not included in the enactment a statement of intent and no floor debate
existed which might have been recorded, the only way to determine intent before turning to
rules of statutory construction is to compare the bill as introduced with the final version. See
[Vol. 30:571
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A. Intermediate Punishment
The Allen court first determined that the amendment involved an
intermediate level of punishment because it did not affect the maxi-
mum or minimum punishment to which Allen could have been sub-
jected.30 This determination places life without parole between life
imprisonment and death. In other words, it is more severe than life
imprisonment, but less severe than a death sentence. Although this
author believes that few legal scholars would disagree with this place-
ment of life without parole,31 he contends that the court has nonethe-
less erred in its determination; first, the amendment may in fact affect
the maximum punishment to which Allen could have been subjected;
and second, even if the amendment does not alter the maximum or
minimum punishment, retroactive application should be prohibited
because it may substantially disadvantage the offender affected by it.
Currently in Oklahoma, before a sentence of death may be con-
sidered in a capital case, certain aggravating circumstances must be
present.32 Unless at least one aggravating circumstance is found, or if
aggravating circumstances are present but outweighed by mitigating
discussion infra part I (discussing how Oklahoma courts attempt to determine legislative in-
tent). Occasionally, some degree of intent can be inferred from the changes made during the
legislative process. However, the only change made in this amendment between introduction
and enactment was the addition of a provision which stated that the amendment would not affect
the powers of the Pardon and Parole Board. See S. 15,41st Leg., 1st Sess. (1987); cf. 1987 Okla.
Sess. Laws 96 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.11, .15 (1991 & Supp.
1994)).
30. Allen v. State, 821 P.2d 371, 376 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d
1054, 1056 (Fla. 1985) (using similar analysis).
31. This excludes, of course, an argument concerning the comparative drawbacks of life in
prison without chance of parole and actual imposition of the death penalty. The court in Allen
avoided discussion of such an argument. See Allen, 821 P.2d at 376.
32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (1991). Aggravating circumstances are defined as:
1. The defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person;
2. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person;
3. The person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration
or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration;
4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;
5. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
or prosecution;
6. The murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment on
conviction of a felony;
7. The existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; or
8. The victim of the murder was a peace officer as defined by Section 99 of Tile 21 of
the Oklahoma Statutes, or guard of an institution under the control of the Department
of Corrections, and such person was killed while in performance of official duty.
Id. § 701.12.
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circumstances,3 3 the death penalty cannot be imposed and is therefore
eliminated as a sentencing option 34 At the time of the decisions in
Wade and Allen, elimination of the death penalty as a sentencing op-
tion left only the options of life without parole or life imprisonment.3
Similarly, if a jury could not agree on punishment within a reasonable
time, the judge was required to dismiss the jury and impose a sentence
of either life imprisonment or life without parole.3 6
Prior to the 1987 amendment adding life without parole, in a situ-
ation where aggravating circumstances were absent or were out-
weighed by mitigating circumstances, the death penalty was
eliminated as a sentencing option, and the only option remaining was
a life sentence.37 Similarly, if a jury could not agree on a sentence, a
life sentence was mandatory.38 After the Allen decision mandated ret-
roactive application of the sentencing amendment, elimination by the
court or jury of the death penalty as a sentencing option or failure of
the jury to agree on a sentence now requires consideration of life with-
out parole, which is a more severe sentence than would have been
possible prior to the effective date of the amendment. Thus, by
designating the amendment procedural and mandating its retroactive
application, the court created a situation wherein actual imposition of
a sentence of life without parole can, in'effect, subject an offender to
an increase in the maximum punishment over what would have been
the maximum under existing law. Elimination of the maximum sen-
tence of death by the absence or subordination of the weight of aggra-
vating circumstances, or by failure of a jury to agree on a sentence,
now changes the maximum punishment from a death sentence to life
33. There is no statutory definition or list of mitigating circumstances. The finder of fact
determines whether a particular circumstance is mitigatory. Malone v. State, 876 P.2d 707, 714
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that the trial court's instruction that "it was the jury's decision
to determine what the mitigating circumstances were under the facts of the case" reflects the
applicable statutes and satisfies constitutional dictates).
34. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (1991).
35. See id, §§ 701.10a, .11 (1991 & Supp. 1994). The legislature subsequently amended
§ 701.10a, deleting the words "of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without parole," and
changed the statute to read "any sentence authorized by law at the time of the commission of the
crime." 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 325 (codified as amended at Oa.A. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10a (Supp.
1994)). However, the 1993 amendment was not in effect at the time of the decisions in Allen
(1991) and Wade (1992). See discussion infra part III.
36. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (1991). This section was included in the 1987 amend-
ment adding life without parole. See 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 96 (codified as amended at OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.11, .15 (1991 & Supp. 1994)).
37. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9, .11 (1981), amended by 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 96 (current
version at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.9 (1991)).
38. Id. § 701.11.
[Vol. 30:571
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without parole; whereas prior to the amendment, the maximum pen-
alty was life imprisonment. Such an increase in the maximum penalty
over what was in effect at the time of the crime is ex post facto and is
constitutionally impermissible.39
If a death sentence is actually imposed, the foregoing problem
does not arise because the punishment does not change. However,
the court, in analyzing this issue, must focus on the potential punish-
ments for a crime, not a specific sentence actually imposed.' In Lind-
sey v. Washington,41 the Supreme Court stated that an increase in the
possible penalty is ex post facto, no matter what penalty is actually
imposed.42 Since there is a potential increase in the maximum punish-
ment to which the defendants in the four instant cases may be sub-
jected when the amendment is applied retroactively, the procedural
classification given to the amendment by the court is not sufficient to
prevent violation of the ex post facto prohibition. 43
B. Substantial Disadvantage
Even in cases where a sentencing amendment does not affect the
maximum or minimum sentence, retroactive application may be pro-
hibited, including cases in which the death penalty is not an option. In
Miller v. Florida,' the United States Supreme Court held that an
amendment which revised sentencing guidelines, although not techni-
cally increasing punishment, could not be applied retroactively.45 The
Court further stated that a penal code amendment could be constitu-
tionally challenged even where an actual sentence imposed under the
new law is less severe than what could have been imposed under the
old law.46 The Miller court decided that the critical question was
whether the retroactive application "substantially disadvantages" the
offender affected by it.47
39. See discussion infra part IV.B (analyzing ex post facto concerns raised by this issue).
40. Allen v. State, 821 P.2d 371, 376 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Miller v. Florida, 482
U.S. 423 (1987)).
41. 301 U.S. 397 (1937).
42. lad at 400-01.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39; 2 J. SuTHmRLAND, STATUTES AND STATU- •
TORY CONsTRUCTnON 447 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 1993) (commenting that "[t]he designa-
tion of changes in a statute as 'procedural' is not in itself the test of whether the statute imposes
an ex post facto burden").
44. 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
45. Id. at 432.
46. Id. (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401-02 (1937)).
47. Id. at 432.
1995]
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In Allen, the court examined this issue of substantial disadvan-
tage and determined that any alternative to a death sentence cannot
be characterized as disadvantageous to the offender.48 However, this
reasoning can only apply after a death penalty has actually been im-
posed. Since the court must focus on the potential punishment for a
crime and not a specific sentence,49 the court's reasoning creates a
standard which does not consider potential punishment, but can only
be applied at the appellate level after a specific sentence of death has
actually been imposed. A trial court cannot know whether an inter-
mediate penalty advantages or disadvantages an offender at the time
of jury instruction, which is the critical time when the decision must be
made concerning application of the new law.
It appears that, in Hain, Salazar, Wade, and Allen, the court was
focusing on specific sentences of death. Consideration of the potential
punishments of death, life without parole, and life, indicates that ret-
roactive application of the amendment may result in an increase in
punishment. This increase would substantially disadvantage the of-
fender50 and should be prohibited.5'
48. Allen v. State, 821 P.2d 371, 376 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
50. In an Oklahoma death penalty case, evidence of aggravating circumstances is admissible
only if it has been made known to the defendant prior to trial. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10(C)
(1991); see also OKLA. CONsr. art. II, § 20; Wilson v. State, 756 P.2d 1240, 1245-46 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1988). Suppose, for example, a defendant is charged with first degree murder and the only
aggravating circumstance is that the defendant was paid to commit the murder. Suppose further
that the only reliable evidence of the aggravating circumstance is a witness who was present at
the time the defendant was hired, and this witness dies prior to trial. As the only other evidence
available to prove the aggravating circumstance is unreliable, the district attorney chooses not to
seek the death penalty. Because the death penalty is not sought, no notice is given to the de-
fendant; thus evidence of the aggravating circumstance is not admissible and the death penalty
cannot be imposed.
In such a case, without retroactive application of the 1987 amendment, the only sentencing
option upon conviction is life imprisonment. If the amendment is applied retroactively, the sen-
tencing option of life without parole is added. Adding life without parole as an option is clearly
an increase in possible punishment. Under Lindsey, the trial court must not instruct the jury on
the life without parole option because it represents an increase in possible punishment. See
supra text accompanying notes 41-42. Yet, if the trial court follows Lindsey in such a case and
does not instruct on life without parole, it cannot at the same time follow Allen, which requires
instruction on life without parole. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16. If the trial court
follows Allen and does instruct the jury on life without parole, the rule in Miller has also been
violated; since life without parole is a more severe punishment than life imprisonment, the de-
fendant has certainly been "substantially disadvantaged." Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432
(1987).
51. Miller, 482 U.S. at 430 (holding that where a retroactive law disadvantages the offender
affected by it, the law is ex post facto, and therefore, it is prohibited).
8
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III. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that its primary goal in
construing statutes is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.52
Therefore, whether a particular statute should apply retroactively or
prospectively requires an inquiry into legislative intent. While retro-
activity is generally disfavored,5 3 deciding when it should apply is not
always a simple task. For retroactive application based upon the lan-
guage of the statute itself, the statute must contain clear language ad-
dressing retroactivity, not merely inferences drawn from the purpose
of the statute.54 Where no clear expression of intent is present but the
language of the statute indicates unambiguously that it can have only
one application, either prospective or retrospective, that language will
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.55 However, a statement of legis-
lative intent is not always included in a statute and, in its absence or if
it is unclear as to retroactivity, the court must attempt on its own to
determine that intent. Where the intention of the legislature is ambig-
uous or unclear, the court will turn to rules of statutory construction in
an effort to determine legislative intent,56 and the general rule dictates
that statutes operate only prospectively.57 By mandating retroactive
application of the statute in Hain, Salazar, Wade, and Allen, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not follow this general
rule.58
52. In re Bomgardner, 711 P.2d 92, 95 (Okla. 1985).
53. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1498 (1994).
54. DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1387 (10th Cir. 1990),
cerL denied, 498 U.S. 1074 (1991).
55. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993).
56. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 383
F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968); Patterson v. Globe Am. Casualty Co.,
685 P.2d 396, 398 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); see also City of Bristow ex rel. Hedges v. Groom, 151
P.2d 936, 940 (Okla. 1944) (stating that "[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all
other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature").
57. Dutton v. Dixon, 757 P.2d 376,381 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds
by Cartwright v. State, 778 P.2d 479 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); see also In re McNeely, 734 P.2d
1294, 1296 n.7 (Okla. 1987); Hammons v. Muskogee Medical Ctr. Auth., 697 P.2d 539,542 (Okla.
1985); Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Leeco Oil Co., 692 P.2d 1364,1366 (Okla. 1985); Freshour v.
Turner, 496 P.2d 389,392 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), overruled on other grounds by Dean v. Crisp,
536 P.2d 961, 963 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), overruled by Edwards v. State, 591 P.2d 313, 317
(Okla. Crim. App. 1979); 2 J. StnrlmRLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.04
(Norman . Singer ed., 5th ed. 1993).
58. Hain v. State, 852 P.2d 744 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1402, and
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1416 (1994); Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Wade
v. State, 825 P.2d 1357 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); Allen v. State, 821 P.2d 371 (Okla. Crim. App.
1991).
9
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The court apparently believes that the Legislature enacted the
1987 amendment to provide an alternative to the death sentence.5 9
Whereas, the author contends that it is indeed more likely that the
Legislature created the sentence of life without parole to provide an
alternative to parole. The following statistical analysis demonstrates
the author's view.
In 1940, when only about twenty eight states had parole boards,
forty four percent of all releases were by parole.6" By 1967, when
every state had a parole board, sixty two percent of all releases were
by parole.61 In 1986, the year before enactment of the amendment,
the median sentence length for murder was twenty years, yet the me-
dian time served before parole was only five years, seven months.62 In
view of these statistics, it is relatively easy for the author to construe
the legislature's intent as correcting a situation in which the punish-
ment for murder actually amounted to less than six years in prison.63
By 1993, thirty three states, the District of Columbia, and the fed-
eral government enacted the sentencing option of life without parole
in an attempt to ensure real life sentences." Fourteen other states
impose a life sentence in which parole is not possible until after
twenty five years have been served.65 It is the author's opinion that
these figures clearly indicate a nationwide attempt to stop, or at least
delay, parole of convicted murderers.66 The language of the 1987
amendment does not indicate whether it was intended as an alterna-
tive to the death penalty or as an alternative to life with parole, but, in
light of these statistics, it is not unreasonable for the author to inter-
pret legislative intent as the latter.
In Judge Lumpkin's Hain and Salazar dissenting opinions, he cor-
rectly pointed out that the real issue in these cases is not the constitu-
tionality of retroactivity, but whether the legislature intended the
59. See Hain, 852 P.2d at 753 (noting a punishment alternative to death); Allen, 821 P.2d at
376 (referring to a sentence which avoids the death penalty).
60. Patrick A. Langan, America's Soaring Prison Population, 251 SCIENCE 1568 (1991).
61. Id.
62. BUREAu OF JUST. STATISTICs, U.S. DBP'T OF JUsTIcE, PUB. No. NCJ-132291, NAT'L
COREcnoNs REPORTImG PROGRAM 36 (1986).
63. Id.
64. Helen Prejean, Should Killers Live? Or Die? Child Murderers and the Death Penalty,
GooD HOUSEKEEPING, Aug. 1993, at 94.
65. Id.
66. Five out of six Americans will be victims of attempted or completed violent crime dur-
ing their lifetimes. James R. Acker, Social Sciences and the Criminal Law: Victims of Crime -
Plight vs. Rights, 28 QuM. L. Buui. 64, 64 (1992).
[Vol. 30:571
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amendment67 to apply retroactively.6" Unfortunately, the majority's
only response was to reason that if the amendment was not given ret-
roactive effect, it would create an "anomalous situation" because of a
subsequent amendment to section 701.10.69
In 1989, the Legislature again amended section 701.10 by adding
section 701.10a.71 Section 701.10a provides the applicable sentencing
procedure for situations where a case is remanded for resentencing
because of prejudicial error in the sentencing phase.7' This amend-
ment allows remand for resentencing without the need for a new trial,
but requires the court to consider the sentence of life without parole.72
Section 701.10a(5) further provides that "[t]he provisions of this sec-
tion are procedural and shall apply retroactively to any defendant sen-
tenced to death".73
The majority in Salazar noted that, if the 1987 amendment were
not given retroactive effect, a defendant whose case was remanded for
resentencing under section 701.10a could receive the benefit of con-
sideration of life without parole, while a defendant whose case was
not remanded would be denied that benefit 7 4 The court reasoned
that such a result would 1)create an "anomalous situation";75 and 2)vi-
olate due process and equal protection.76 Therefore, the court chose
to solve this "anomaly" by retroactively applying the 1987 amendment
to section 701.9 as well.' 7 However, at least four persuasive argu-
ments directly controvert the court's solution.
First, section 701.10a does not operate unless there is prejudicial
error in the sentencing proceeding. 78 In Hain, Salazar, Wade, and Al-
len, the only prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding was the
67. 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 96 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.11, .15
(1991 & Supp. 1994)).
68. Hain v. State, 852 P.2d 744,755 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), cerL denied, 114 S. Ct. 1402,
and cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1416 (1994) (Lumpkin, PJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 743 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (Lumpkin, P3., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
69. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 740.
70. 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws 365 (codified as amended at OK.A. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10a (Supp.
1994)).
71. OK. A. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10a (Supp. 1994).
72. Id.
73. Id.




78. Oma... STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10a (Supp. 1994).
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failure to consider life without parole,79 which section 701.10a re-
quired only if prejudicial error existed.80 This reasoning is clearly cir-
cular and does not explain or justify retroactive application of the
1987 amendment, especially when the amendment did not include a
procedural classification or a statement of intended retroactive
effect.8 '
Second, section 701.10a contains an express classification as pro-
cedural and a clear statement that the Legislature intends for it to
operate retroactively.' This language is absent from section 701.10,83
but could easily have been included in the 1989 amendment, since it
was an amendment to section 701.10. General rules of statutory con-
struction provide that the absence of such language in all sections af-
fected by the 1987 amendment 84 indicates the Legislature's intention
against retroactive application.85
The author's position is further supported by the third argument
against the court's solution. Specifically, the 1987 amendment was ap-
proved on May 18, 1987, and section 7 provided that the effective date
of the amendment would be November 1, 1987.86 It is a virtual oxy-
moron for the legislature to fix a future effective date for an amend-
ment if it really intends to apply the amendment retroactively.
Moreover, the very purpose for establishing a future effective date is
defeated by a construction giving effect to the statute prior to the time
fixed by the legislatureY
79. Hain v. State, 852 P.2d 744, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1402,
and cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1416 (1994); Salazar, 852 P.2d at 736-41; Wade v. State, 825 P.2d 1357,
1363 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); Allen v. State, 821 P.2d 371, 375-76 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
80. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10a (Supp. 1994).
81. See 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 96 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.11,
.15 (1991 & Supp. 1994)).
82. See supra text accompanying note 73.
83. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (Supp. 1994).
84. See supra note 29.
85. As one commentator notes:
One of the cardinal rules by which courts are governed in interpreting statutes is that
they must be construed as prospective in every instance, except where the legislative
intent that they shall act retrospectively is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms,
or such intent is necessarily implied from the language of the statute, which would be
inoperative otherwise than retrospectively.
WiLLIAM P. WADE, A TREA-TsE ON THE OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF RMROACTIVE
LAws § 34, at 39-40 (1982).
86. 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 96 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.11, .15
(1991 & Supp. 1994)).
87. WILLIAM P. WADE, A TREATISE ON THE OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF RETRO-
AcrrvE LAWS § 33, at 39 (1982).
[Vol. 30:571
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Finally, the above-mentioned analysis arrives at the conclusion
that the Oklahoma Legislature did not intend retroactive application
of the 1987 amendment and is convincingly supported by another
amendment to section 701.10a enacted on June 7, 1993.88 In a case
involving remand for error, the 1993 amendment deleted the specific
sentencing options of life imprisonment and life without parole and
replaced them with language permitting any sentence which was au-
thorized at the time the crime was committed.8 9 This change clearly
indicates that the legislature intended the 1987 amendment to operate
prospectively, not retroactively, and that the proper penalty in
Oklahoma is that which was in effect at the time the crime was
committed.
After the decision in Salazar, the State filed a petition for rehear-
ing.90 Then, after the effective date of the 1993 amendment, the State
filed a motion to amend its petition, arguing that this amendment war-
ranted a new hearing for Salazar.91 As previously noted, section
701.10a contains an express statement that it is procedural and is in-
tended to apply retroactively.9 However, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, incredibly, refused to apply this new amendment
retroactively, stating that it would deprive Salazar of a sentencing op-
tion granted by the court.93 In short, the court retroactively applied
the 1987 amendment, which contained no language regarding retroac-
tivity,94 and refused to retroactively apply the 1993 amendment to sec-
tion 701.10a, which contained an express legislative statement that it
was to be applied retroactively. 95
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals further reasoned that
application of the 1993 amendment would result in more severe pen-
alty options because Salazar had relied on the court's earlier decisions,
thereby violating the prohibition against ex post facto laws.96 In his
dissenting opinion, Judge Lumpkin pointed out that this type of rea-
soning would mean that every time the Supreme Court reversed a
88. See 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 325 (codified as amended at OaA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10a
(Supp. 1994)).
89. Id.
90. Salazar v. State, 859 P.2d 517 (Okla. Crim. App.), denying reh'g to 852 P.2d 729 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1993).
91. Id. at 518.
92. See supra text accompanying note 73.
93. Salazar, 859 P.2d at 518.
94. See Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 737 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
95. Salazar, 859 P.2d at 518.
96. Id. at 518-19.
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lower court, an ex post facto violation would occur because the de-
fendant may have become disadvantaged by reliance on the lower
court's ruling until that ruling was reversed.97 He also noted that
Wade and Allen, in which the court established that the 1987 amend-
ment should apply retroactively,9" were decided after Salazar's trial.99
Therefore, Salazar could not have relied detrimentally on those deci-
sions, except perhaps briefly during appeal. 100
The final argument controverting the court's solution is that ret-
roactive application violates equal protection.10 1 By mandating retro-
active application of the 1987 amendment, the court has made it
possible for two persons separately committing the same offense on
the same day to receive different treatment when sentenced.102 Such
a situation violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.10 3
In addition, the retroactivity solution chosen by the court ignores the
saving clause embodied in the Oklahoma Constitution.1°4
97. Id. at 520 (Lumpkin, PJ., dissenting).
98. Wade v. State, 825 P.2d 1357, 1363 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); Allen v. State, 821 P.2d
371, 377-78 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
99. Salazar, 859 P.2d at 520 (Lumpkin, PJ., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also discussion infra part IV.C (discussing equal
protection).
102. Consider the situation where two defendants commit separate crimes on the same day,
prior to the effective date of the amendment. One pleads guilty and is sentenced before the
amendment becomes effective; the other demands a jury trial and is not tried and sentenced until
after the effective date of the amendment. The defendant who pled guilty before the amend-
ment became effective Would not receive the sentencing option of life without parole; whereas,
the other defendant would receive the option.
103. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see also discussion infra part IV.C (discussing equal
protection).
104. "The repeal of a statute shall not revive a statute previously repealed by such statute,
nor shall such repeal affect any accrued right, or penalty incurred, or proceedings begun by
virtue of such repealed statute." OKLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 54.
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IV. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
A. Saving Clauses
1. The Doctrine of Abatement: Precursor to Saving Clauses1 5
At common law, absent express language to the contrary, repeal
of a statute resulted in the abatement of all pending prosecutions. 10 6
Historically, repeal includes a re-enactment of the same law with dif-
ferent penalties,0 7 such as the amendment at issue in Allen.' In
such a situation, unless the courts found a specific legislative intent to
the contrary, the doctrine prevented prosecution under either the old,
repealed statute or the new law with different penalties. 0 9 Under the
abatement doctrine, it was reasoned that prosecution could not be
continued under the old statute because it had been repealed." 0 If
the new law increased punishment or the scope of prohibited conduct,
prosecution could not be commenced under it because it would be ex
post facto."' This interpretation often led to injustice and actual
thwarting of legislative intent." 2
A vivid example of such a result is the case of In re Medley." 3
Medley was convicted of murder and sentenced to hang, but Colorado
statutes permitted him to be kept in a prison located in the county
where his friends, clergy, and legal counsel resided." 4 After his crime,
but prior to sentencing, Colorado enacted a statute which provided
that 1) a person sentenced to death must be placed in solitary confine-
ment in the state prison until the date of execution; 2) the state could
105. Abatement refers to "[t]he suspension or cessation, in whole or in part, of a continuing
charge." BLAcK's LAW DicnoNARY 4 (6th ed. 1990). Under the doctrine of abatement, repeal
of a criminal statute causes the abatement, or cessation, of any prosecution pending under the
repealed statute. See Comment, Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime: Retroactive Application of
Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 120 (1972) [hereinafter Comment]
(discussing the doctrine of abatement).
106. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 230 (1964); Cartwright v. State, 778 P.2d 479, 482
(Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that in Oklahoma, a case is considered pending from the time
of its commencement until its final determination upon appeal), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1015
(1990).
107. See Comment, supra note 105, at 123.
108. 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 96 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.11, .15
(1991 & Supp. 1994)).
109. Comment, supra note 105, at 123.
110. Comment, supra note 105, at 124-25.
111. Commen4 supra note 105, at 124-25.
112. See, eg., State v. Henderson, 64 La. Ann. 489 (1858); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 28
Mass. (11 Pick.) 350 (1831).
113. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
114. Id at 161-62.
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not reveal the execution date to the prisoner; and 3) all statutes in
conflict with the new statute were repealed.115
The Supreme Court held that the new statute was ex post facto,
and therefore could not be applied to Medley. 16 Since the old statute
was repealed by the new one, he could no longer be held under it
either; consequently, he was ordered released.117 This decision was
particularly embarrassing to the Court because there was no error
concerning the trial or jury verdict." 8 Medley was guilty and properly
convicted, yet the Court was compelled to order his release." 9
The previous analysis of Medley makes it clear that the Supreme
Court was attempting to find and implement the intent of the legisla-
ture. Thus, despite this effort to follow legislative intent, application
of the doctrine of abatement as a rule of construction actually
thwarted the purpose of the legislature in cases where the doctrine
was legislatively ignored. 20 To overcome this problem,' 2' legislatures
devised general saving legislation applicable to all repeals, amend-
ments, and re-enactments. 22
115. Id. at 163-64.
116. Id. at 171. The court determined that solitary confinement in a prison located away
from friends, clergy, and legal counsel was a more severe penalty than that under the previous
law. Id. at 170.
117. Id. at 173.
118. Id. (quoting that "[a] question presents itself, however, to the court which is not a little
embarrassing").
119. Id. at 173-74.
120. See, eg., State v. Henderson, 13 La. Ann. 489 (1858); State v. King, 12 La. Ann. 593
(1857); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 350 (1831).
121. Note that although most abatement problems arose from legislative inadvertence or
carelessness, the potential existed for effectively creating "legislative pardons." By intentionally
refraining from addressing abatement in a repeal of a statute, the legislature could effectively
"pardon" an offender. Repeal of the statute under which the offender was charged, with no
provision for continuing prosecution under a new or amended statute, would result in the release
of the offender. Cf. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 174 (1890).
122.
The history of legislation... shows that through the inattention, carelessness and inad-
vertence of the law-making body crimes and penalties have been abolished, changed or
modified after the commission of the offense and before trial in such material way as to
effect many legislative pardons. To prevent such mistakes and miscarriages of justice
many of the states have enacted general saving statutes.
Comment, supra note 105, at 127 n.50 (quoting La Porte v. State, 132 P. 563, 564-65 (Ariz. 1913)).
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2. Effects of a Saving Clause
Currently, forty three states, as well as the federal government,
have made a statutory provision for saving pending criminal prosecu-
tions from abatement following repeal of the underlying criminal stat-
ute."z While most saving clauses are statutes, three additional states
have them in their state constitutions: Florida, New Mexico, and
Oklahoma.124 Oklahoma's saving clause states that repeal of a statute
will not affect any penalty incurred or proceedings begun under the
repealed statute125
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that it is immaterial
whether an existing statute is specifically repealed and a new one
passed, or whether the existing statute is modified by amendment.126
In either case, a new statute is created and the old one ceases to ex-
ist. 27 As a general principle, the court commented that if a criminal
statute is amended to reduce punishment, a defendant is normally en-
titled to the benefit of the new act. 28 This result occurs even where
the offense was committed prior to the new law.129 However, the
court ultimately decided that this principle does not apply when there
123. 1 U.S.C. § 109 (1971); ALA. CODE § 1-1-12 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 01.05.021 (1990);
Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-246, 1-247 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-120 (Michie 1987); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 9608 (Vest 1992); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 2-4-303 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. Am.
§ 54-194 (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-11 (1992); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 1-11 (1985); IDAHo
CODE § 67-513 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 70/4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 1-1-5-1 (Bums 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.1.26 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-201
(1989); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 446.110 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 24:171 (West 1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 302 (West 1989); MD. RULES OF INmRPRE-
TATMON CODE ANN. § 3 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 6 (West 1986); MicH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 8.4(a) (West 1994); MNmN. STAT. ANN. § 645.35 (West 1947); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-1 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.160 (Vernon 1969); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-205 (1993);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 49-301 (1993); NEv. REv. STAT. § 169.235 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 21:38 (1988); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-15 (West 1992); N.Y. GEN. CONSrR. LAW § 94 (McKinney
1951); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-17 (1987); Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 1.58 (Baldwin 1990); OR.
REv. STAT. § 161.035 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 43-3-23 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 2-
14-18 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-101 (1994); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.031 (West
1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-5 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 214 (1985); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 1-16 (Michie 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.01.040 (West 1990); W. VA. CODE § 2-2-8
(1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 990.04 (West 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 8-1-107 (1977).
124. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 9; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 33; OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 54.
125. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 54 (stating that "[t]he repeal of a statute shall not revive a
statute previously repealed by such statute, nor shall such repeal affect any accrued right, or
penalty incurred, or proceedings begun by virtue of such repealed statute").
126. Moorehead v. Hunter, 198 F.2d 52, 53 (10th Cir. 1952); see also United States v. Tynen,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88, 92 (1870) (holding that, even where not expressly repealed, if the later act
covers the whole subject of the earlier act, includes new provisions, and plainly shows it was
intended as a substitute for the earlier act, it operates as a repeal).
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is a general saving statute or a specific saving clause in the repealing
statute. 3 o
Oklahoma's saving clause contained in its constitution, along with
this holding by the Tenth Circuit, indicates that the 1987 amendment
should not be applied retroactively. 131 Any proceeding, which begins
under a statute that is subsequently repealed or amended, should be
continued under the provisions of the repealed or amended statute.132
The saving clause, in effect, designates the appropriate criminal pen-
alty as that which was in effect at the time of the crime. 33 Moreover,
because the clause contains no provision for legislative alteration,
even a legislative statement of retroactive intent should be ineffective
because no constitutional amendment has been obtained. 34 The Leg-
islature, on its own, cannot revise the constitution, nor can a court.3 5
However, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, once again, re-
lied on the procedural classification of the 1987 amendment to avoid
this constitutional provision. 36
In Salazar, Judge Lumpkin cited Bowman v. State,137 which dealt
with the subject of retroactive application of criminal penalties. 38 In
Bowman, the court mentioned the well established rule that the ap-
propriate penalty is that which was in effect at the time of the
130. Id.
131. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 54 (stating "[t]he repeal of a statute shall not.., affect any...
penalty incurred, or proceedings begun by virtue of such repealed statute"); Moorehead, 198
F.2d at 53 (holding that amendment of a statute operates as a repeal).
132. See, eg., Bilbrey v. State, 135 P.2d 999 (Okla. Crim. App. 1943) (holding that statutes
repealing penalties for offenses operate prospectively and are applicable only to offenses com-
mitted after the statute becomes effective); Penn v. State, 164 P. 992 (Okla. Crim. App. 1917)
(holding that the constitutional saving clause prevents the legislature from removing penalties
for crimes committed prior to the effective date of a repealing statute); Lilly v. State, 123 P. 575
(Okla. Crim. App. 1912) (holding that the district court, in a trial for robbery, should submit the
punishment as it existed at the time of the crime because of the constitutional provision).
133. See, e.g., Rozinsky v. State, 298 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. 1974) (holding that sentence must
be imposed under the law in effect at the time of the crime); Gourley v. State, 432 So. 2d 755,755
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed sub nom. Gourley v. Wainwright, 458 So. 2d 272 (Fla.
1984); State v. Pizarro, 383 So. 2d 762,763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that, under Florida
law, the punishment in effect at the time of the crime controls the penalty at sentencing).
Florida's constitutional saving clause states that "[r]epeal or amendment of a criminal stat-
ute shall not affect prosecution or punishment for any crime previously committed." FLA.
CoN sr. art. X, § 9.
134. See Ou.A. CoNsr. art. XXIV, §§ 1-3 (requiring a vote of the people for any amendment
to the constitution).
135. Id.
136. See Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 738 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that
Oklahoma's saving clause does not apply to procedural changes).
137. 789 P.2d 631 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
138. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 741 (Lumpkin, PJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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crime. 39 In response to Judge Lumpkin, the majority distinguished
Bowman from Salazar by noting that Bowman relied on the
Oklahoma saving clause.14° The Salazar court stated that the
Oklahoma saving clause did not apply to procedural changes in the
law, and therefore had no bearing on the case.14 '
As previously discussed, classification of the 1987 amendment as
substantive or procedural has been disputed. 42 If substantive, the
Oklahoma saving clause would apply in Salazar, as well as Hain,
Wade, and Allen. 43 Even if, however, the amendment is procedural,
the saving clause does not distinguish between procedural statutes and
substantive statutes; 44 it merely states that repeal will not affect any
penalty incurred or proceedings begun under the repealed statute.145
Hain, Salazar, Wade, and Allen were all defendants in proceedings
that began prior to the 1987 amendment, and thus, they were subject
to either the death penalty or life imprisonment; i.e. the penalty in-
curred under the repealed statute. Accordingly, the author opines
that the defendants should not have been entitled to the option of life
without parole.
B. Ex Post Facto
A fundamental principle underlying American criminal law dic-
tates that the public is entitled to some advance warning as to what
conduct is criminal and the penalties for engaging in such conduct. 46
Governmental restraint and lack of fair notice preclude the legislature
from increasing punishment over that which was in existence at the
time the crime was committed. 47 In addition, the ex post facto prohi-
bition upholds the separation of powers by confining the legislature to
criminal enactments with prospective effect, and the judiciary and ex-
ecutive to applications of criminal law."
139. Bowman, 789 P.2d at 631 (citing Penn v. State, 164 P. 992 (Okla. Crim. App. 1917);
Alberty v. State, 140 P. 1025 (Okla. Crim. App. 1914)).
140. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 738 (holding the saving clause inapplicable to procedural
amendments).
141. Id. at 738.
142. See supra Part II.
143. See Salazar, 852 P.2d at 738 (citing Penn v. State, 164 P. 992 (Okla. Crim. App. 1917)
and Alberty v. State, 140 P. 1025 (Okla. Crim. App. 1914), both holding that Oklahoma's saving
clause allowed the prior law to be applied).
144. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 54.
145. Id.
146. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 8 (2d ed. 1986).
147. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
148. Id. at n.10.
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The United States Constitution prohibits enactment of any ex
post facto law by Congress 49 or state legislatures.5 0 The Oklahoma
Constitution contains a similar provision.'" Although the constitu-
tional prohibitions specifically address only legislative action, the
United States Supreme Court has held that judicial action also falls
within this prohibition. 52
A precise definition of ex post facto has not been established, but
most courts rely on the classifications set forth by Calder v. Bull'53 in
1798. In that opinion, Justice Chase set forth four types of laws which
he considered to be within the prohibition: 1)any law making an act
criminal which was not a criminal act when committed; 2)any law
making a criminal act more severe than when committed; 3)any law
which increases the punishment over the punishment in effect when
the crime was committed; and 4)any law which alters rules of evidence
in order to convict an offender. 5 4
Of these four categories, laws included in the third section pertain
to this discussion. A violation of the third prohibition requires exami-
nation of the law and judicial application, not an analysis of the spe-
cific penalties imposed in a certain case. 5 An increase in the possible
penalty is ex post facto because the clause looks to the standard of
punishment in a statute rather than a sentence actually imposed.1 56
149. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
150. Id. § 10, cl. 1.
151. See OKLA. CoNsr. art. 2, § 15.
152. See Boule v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352-55 (1964) (noting that judicial action
which operates ex post facto is actually prohibited by the Due Process Clause, since the ex post
facto prohibition applies only to legislative action. When an "unforeseeable state-court con-
struction of a criminal statute is applied retroactively to subject a person to criminal liability for
past conduct, the effect is to deprive him of due process of law"); see also Riggs v. Branch, 554
P.2d 823, 825 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a
criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law).
153. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
154. Id. The opinion of Justice Chase is most often quoted, but should probably not be
treated as the opinion of the Court. Justice Chase's actual categories were:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggra-
vates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the
crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commis-
sion of the offence [sic], in order to convict the offender.
Id.
155. Allen v. State, 821 P.2d 371, 376 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Miller v. Florida, 482
U.S. 423 (1987)).
156. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937); Allen v. State, 821 P.2d 371, 376
(Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
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Application of this rule to the 1987 amendment indicates that ret-
roactive application violates the constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws. 5 7 As demonstrated earlier, it is possible for retroac-
tive application to result in an increase in punishment over that in
effect at the time of the offense. 1 8 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals has apparently not considered the potential for increased
punishment. Instead, the court has only considered the specific sen-
tence of death imposed upon Hain, Salazar, Wade, and Allen and de-
termined that each should receive the benefit of the amended
statute. 9
In Allen, the court held that the 1987 amendment did not violate
ex post facto because it was a procedural amendment.1 60 However, in
Collins v. Youngblood,'6' the Supreme Court stated that simply label-
ling a law procedural does not prevent scrutiny under the ex post facto
prohibition. 6 2 Whereas, in Beazell v. Ohio,163 the Court stated that
the constitutional prohibition is addressed to laws, in any form, which
increase punishment or alter the definition of an offense.16
Ultimately, in Weaver v. Graham,'65 the court refined Justice
Chase's four categories of ex post facto laws into two: 1)the law must
apply to events occurring before its enactment; and 2)the law must
disadvantage the offender affected by it.' 66 The procedural classifica-
tion given the 1987 amendment by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals does not, under Collins, 67 prevent ex post facto scrutiny. 68
Under such scrutiny, judicial retroactive application of the amend-
ment potentially disadvantages the offender by increasing punish-
ment, 6 9 and is therefore constitutionally prohibited. 70
157. See Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 737 n.5 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (stating that "laws
which materially prejudice the defendant cannot be applied retroactively").
158. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
159. Hain v. State, 852 P.2d 744,753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1402,
and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1416 (1994); Salazar, 852 P.2d at 740-41; Wade v. State, 825 P.2d 1357,
1363 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); Allen v. State, 821 P.2d 371, 376-77 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
160. Allen, 821 P.2d at 376.
161. 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
162. Id. at 46 (1990). But cf. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884) (approving procedural
changes "leaving untouched the nature of the crime and the amount or degree of proof essential
to conviction").
163. 269 U.S. 167 (1925).
164. Id. at 170.
165. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
166. Id. at 29.
167. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
168. Id. at 46.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 160-68.
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C. Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits any state from denying any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of its laws. 7' Upon first reading, the equal protec-
tion clause appears to guarantee equal operation of the laws upon all
citizens. However, laws need not affect every citizen exactly alike to
satisfy equal protection requirements.172 Equal protection essentially
guarantees that no person or class of persons will be denied rights
enjoyed by other persons or classes of persons in like circum-
stances.'73 The equal protection clause concerns governmental ac-
tions which classify. It does not prohibit nor prevent classifications
since virtually all laws require some type of classification. 174 How-
ever, it does prohibit classifications which are arbitrary or unreasona-
ble.175 Unfortunately, determining whether a classification is arbitrary
or unreasonable presents a difficult problem.
Traditionally, a ."reasonable basis" or "rational basis" test has
been applied where equal protection is challenged concerning a social
or economic classification, such as in the area of criminal law.176
Under the rational basis test, the court first determines whether a le-
gitimate government purpose exists for the classification; then, it de-
cides whether the classification is arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or
irrelevant to the government's purpose.177
171. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 states:
[N]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, 'or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
172. Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 142 (1925).
173. Kentucky Fm. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544,550 (1923); Tuax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 333 (1921); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 334 (1905); Connolly v.
Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 559 (1902); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 598
(1901).
174. For example, a law which creates a state income tax rate of 33% only for persons mak-
ing $35,000 per year "classifies" all those making $35,000 per year as a group, and only that
group must pay a 33% tax. This classification, by itself, does not necessarily mean that equal
protection has been denied.
175. Walters v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268,272 (1951). In the example, supra note 174, imagine now that a state created the 33%
tax rate only for persons who unsuccessfully ran against incumbent state legislators. This law
would undoubtedly fail as capricious and arbitrary, as well as unreasonable.
176. Peterson v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 850 P.2d 893, 897 (Kan. 1993). There are two other
tests generally used by the courts for different types of challenges: 1)intermediate-level scrutiny;
and 2)strict scrutiny. See LAURENcE H. TamE, AMmrucAN CoNST ONAL LAW § 16 (2d ed.
1988).
177. See Ross v. Peters, 846 P.2d 1107, 1116 (Okla. 1993).
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In Hain and Salazar, the court held the retroactive application of
the 1987 amendment was limited to cases where the amendment was
in effect at the time of the trial. 7 This holding effectively created a
classification of defendants who were charged with first degree mur-
der prior to November 1, 1987, and whose trials were not completed
before that date.17 9 The purpose of the court's classification was to
provide an alternative to the death penalty for those whose crime oc-
curred a short time before the effective date of the amendment.8 0
However, the court limited application of this alternative to those de-
fendants not yet sentenced at the time the amendment became effec-
tive.' 81 This appears to be an arbitrary classification because it
excludes others similarly situated. Establishing the cutoff date for
sentencing on November 1, 1987, omits persons who would also bene-
fit from an alternative to the death penalty. Apparently, a defendant
whose death sentence was imposed just three days before the amend-
ment became effective would not receive the benefit.'" Even a death
sentence imposed years earlier that was still in the process of direct
review would not receive the benefit.'83 Two persons committing the
178. See Hain v. State, 852 P.2d 744, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1402, and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1416 (1994); Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 740-41 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1993).
179. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 738 (quoting that "[t]his Court has never suggested that the life
without parole option is applicable to cases where a defendant's trial and conviction occurred
before the effective date of the amendment").
180. Hain, 852 P.2d at 753; Salazar, 852 P.2d at 737.
181. See Hain, 852 P.2d at 753; Salazar, 852 P.2d at 741.
182. Daniel Juan Revilla is currently on Oklahoma's death row under a sentence of death.
ATroRNEY GENERAiLs DEATH BOOK (on file with the Okla. Att'y Gen.'s Office). He was sen-
tenced on October 29, 1987, just three days prior to the amendment's effective date. Id. Darrell
Lynn Thomas, also on death row, was sentenced on October 9, 1987. Id.
183. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 740 (stating that "[tihe length of time it takes to process a death
penalty case to finality is patently absurd.")
This process can indeed be lengthy. Scott Hain committed his crime on October 6, 1987,
and the Court of Criminal Appeals did not decide his direct appeal until September 14, 1993.
See Hain, 852 P.2d at 744, 746. Upon remand for resentencing, Hain was again sentenced to
death on September 30, 1994. His appeal process has begun anew.
Another example of the length of time required for final disposition of a death sentence
case is Dutton v. Dixon, 757 P.2d 376 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). Dutton was convicted and sen-
tenced to death in May, 1979, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by
a unanimous decision in 1984. Dutton v. State, 674 P.2d 1134 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984). Dutton then appealed the denial of state post-conviction relief,
which was denied in an unpublished order on February 8, 1985. Dutton v. State, No. PC-84-665
(Okla. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 1985). He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which was denied on July 12, 1985. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief. Dutton v. Brown,
788 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1986), rev'd on reh'g, 812 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied sub
nom. Dutton v. Maynard, 484 U.S. 836, and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987). Following rehear-
ing en banc, however, Dutton's death sentence was vacated by the Tenth Circuit. Dutton v.
Brown, 812 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied sub nor. Dutton v. Maynard, 484 U.S.
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same offense on the same day could easily receive different treatment
if one is tried and convicted prior to the effective date of the amend-
ment and the other is not.184
Classification based upon sentencing date may also violate equal
protection because of economic classification. Persons unable to af-
ford bail generally receive speedier trials than persons who are not
held in jail because they are able to make bail.' In Griffin v. Illi-
nois,186 the Supreme Court declared that there is no equal justice if
the kind of trial a person gets depends upon his financial situation. 8 7
If defendants can slow down the criminal process, classifications based
upon the sentencing date can be the ultimate reward. For example,
where a defendant successfully postpones the sentencing date, the
penalty may be reduced if a newly enacted law lessens punishment.
Such a result could violate equal protection.1 8
The Supreme Court, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,89 stated that the cru-
cial question in any equal protection argument is whether some ra-
tional basis exists for the different treatment of persons who commit
the same act on the same day but are apprehended, convicted, or
whose appeals are finalized on different days.190 Arguably, no
836, and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987). The Tenth Circuit directed the district court to issue a
writ of habeas corpus, modifying Dutton's sentence to life imprisonment unless the State com-
menced new sentencing proceedings to relitigate the issue of punishment. Id. The process be-
gins again after resentencing.
184. Scott Hain did not commit his crimes alone. See Hain, 852 P.2d at 746. His co-defend-
ant, Robert Wayne Lambert, was also convicted and sentenced to death; in December of 1994,
his conviction was overturned by the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded for a new trial.
Lambert v. State, No. F-88-388, 1994 WL 697500 (Okla. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 1994) (finding re-
versible error where the trial court instructed the jury on felpny murder when only malice afore-
thought murder was charged in the information), remanded by 808 P.2d 72 (Okla. Crim. App.
1991). Because of the reversal of convictions, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not consider
issues concerning the second stage proceedings, and therefore, made no decision regarding the
sentencing option of life without parole. Imagine though, if Lambert had pled guilty and been
sentenced prior to the effective date of the amendment; two co-defendants in the same case
could have received different sentencing options.
185. See W. Peter Doren I, Note, Criminal Law - Retrospective Application of Statute Re-
ducing Penalty, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1157, 1169 (1972).
186. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
187. Id. at 19.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 189-92.
189. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
190. Id. at 447. Consider the case of Forest Wade, who committed his crime in 1986 but was
not apprehended until two years later. See Wade v. State, 825 P.2d 1357,1360 (Okla. Crim. App.
1992). By not being apprehended until after the amendment became effective, he received the
benefit of the new sentencing option, whereas others committing similar crimes in 1986 but who
were captured earlier, did not. Id.; see also United States v. Meyers, 143 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Alaska
1956) (stating that a statute prescribing differing degrees of punishment for the same offense
committed under the same circumstances by persons in like situations violates equal protection);
State v. King, 149 N.W.2d 509, 516 (S.D. 1967) (noting imposition of different punishments or
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grounds exist to explain or justify such different treatment in the in-
stant cases. The court in Hain and Salazar stated that interests of
"fundamental fairness" compelled those decisions,191 yet, much in
those decisions is not at all fair.192
V. PRACrICAL EFFECTS OF RETROACTIV1TY
Thus far, discussion has centered around decisions of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the reasoning employed in
those decisions, and viable arguments against such decisions. It is also
important to contemplate the practical effect of those decisions. Ac-
cordingly, this section will analyze the inequities of a situation where
an intermediate level of punishment becomes effective after commis-
sion of the crime but prior to sentencing, the expense and difficulty of
remanding for resentencing, and the effect such inequities have on the
families of the victims.
Consider first the current dilemma of an Oklahoma trial judge in
a capital case in which a sentencing amendment containing a new, in-
termediate level of punishment becomes effective after commission of
the crime but prior to sentencing. In the sentencing phase of the trial,
the judge must instruct the jury on the range of punishment the jury is
allowed to consider. 3 Because of the decisions in Hain, Salazar,
Wade, and Allen, the trial judge must now instruct the jury on the new
punishment option as well as options existing prior to the amend-
ment.' 9 However, the trial judge does not, at the time of jury instruc-
tion, know whether a death sentence will actually be imposed. For
example, if the jury cannot agree on a verdict and thereafter elimi-
nates the death penalty as a sentencing option, the judge may err by
degrees of punishment upon one than is imposed on all for like offenses denies equal
protection).
191. Hain v. State, 852 P.2d 744, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1402,
and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1416 (1994); Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 739 (Okla. Crim. App.
1993).
192. For example, in many cases where there are multiple defendants, the defendants are not
tried at the same time. Court schedules, defensive tactics, motion hearings, and the like can
delay the trial of one defendant longer than the trial of another. If an amendment lessening
penalties becomes effective before the trials of all co-defendants are complete, a rule of retroac-
tivity based on a specific date is unfair to any defendant unfortunate enough to have a "speed-
ier" trial. Similarly, a criminal who successfully avoids capture until after the effective date of an
ameliorative statute will get the benefit of the new statute. Such occurrences are certainly unfair
to those captured and tried under the old statute.
193. See, e.g., Wade v. State, 825 P.2d 1357, 1363 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that trial
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the amended sentencing option).
194. Hain, 852 P.2d at 753; Salazar, 852 P2d at 740; Wade, 825 P.2d at 1363; Allen v. State,
821 P.2d 371, 377 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
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instructing on a more severe penalty than was in effect at the time of
the crime. In such a case, an appellate court may very well reverse
and remand for resentencing because of that error.195 Yet, if the trial
judge does not instruct on the new option, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals will reverse and remand for resentencing because Allen was not
followed.196 In effect, the trial judge is forced to err.
Consider also the expense and difficulty of remanding for resen-
tencing. For example, Scott Allen Hain committed his crime in 1987,
but the case was not remanded for resentencing until 1993.197 The
ability of the State to present its case after many years have lapsed can
be significantly affected. During such a length of time, witnesses may
die, evidence can deteriorate or get lost, and memories can fade.198
The added expense of a new proceeding is also burdensome to
strained court budgets and overcrowded dockets.199
Consider also the effect on the families of the victims. 20 0 Family
members are often witnesses in such cases, and will, in any event, nor-
mally attend the trials and other proceedings.20 ' Most capital cases
receive much media attention, and family members are reminded dur-
ing each proceeding of the loss of their loved one as well as the often
195. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925) (holding that laws which increase punish-
ment are constitutionally prohibited).
196. Allen, 821 P.2d at 377 (holding that the court must give proper consideration to all three
possible punishments).
197. Hain, 852 P.2d at 744-46.
198. See Alan F. Blakley, Comment, The Cost of Killing Criminals, 18 N. Ky. L. Irav. 61, 77
(1990).
199. The cost of a jury trial has been estimated to be as high as $176,000. Id. at 76 n.129.
200. Laura Lee Sanders and Michael Houghton, killed by Scott Hain and Robert Lambert,
left behind families who have been forced to relive the tragedy four times over seven years, and
must do so at least once more when Lambert is retried. Imagine receiving news of a family
member being cruelly and heinously murdered, then having to sit through separate trials of the
two persons who killed that family member and listen to the horrible details of the crime each
time. Then, seven years later, the case is remanded for resentencing, and the ordeal begins
again. Studies indicate that violent crime affects the families of victims as well as the victims
themselves. Divorce, severe depression, alcoholism, drug addiction, and stress related illnesses
can occur among family members; and, suicide is not uncommon. Tom Gibbons, Victims Again -
Survivors Suffer Through Capital Appeals, 74 A.B.A. J. 64, 67 (1988). Resentencing after a pe-
riod of years requires the evidence to be re-introduced because a different jury is empaneled
than that at the original trial. This process virtually amounts to a completely new trial because
the newly empaneled jury must hear all the evidence before it can render a verdict.
201. About 31 states have crime-victim bills of rights; 39 states allow victim-impact state-
ments; 34 states, and the federal government have crime-victim restitution laws; and most states
require victim notification of critical court proceedings. Id. These proceedings, as well as cases
which require family members as witnesses, keep the families of victims actively involved with
court proceedings throughout the course of the judicial process. IL "Families of murdered vic-
tims are forced to serve a life sentence without parole." Id. at 66.
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grisly details of the crime. When a case is remanded for new proceed-
ings, this process can continue for years and further traumatizes the
families of the victims.202
These problems are unavoidable and must be dealt with when an
error of constitutional significance forces remand. However, a purely
arbitrary decision for retroactive application by a court, not made for
protection of constitutional rights, should not be allowed to create
such problems. In Salazar, the court stated that its decision to retro-
actively apply the amendment and remand for resentencing would
save "valuable state and judicial resources as well as provide certainty
and resolution to this case. 203 This statement is as unexplainable as
the decision itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
Constitutional provisions which protect the rights of individuals,
as well as the interests of the State, cannot be dismissed by simply
labelling a criminal statute procedural and applying it retroactively.
No matter what label is attached, retroactive application must be ex-
amined for constitutional violations of the ex post facto prohibition,
the saving clause provision, and the guarantee of equal protection.
Most importantly, it must be determined whether the legislature in-
tended retroactive application.
After analyzing the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals deci-
sions in Hain, Salazar, Wade, and Allen, no compelling argument ex-
ists to conclude that the Oklahoma Legislature intended the 1987
amendment to apply retroactively. In fact, the opposite is true. Many
compelling arguments show that the amendment was intended to op-
erate prospectively only. Thus, a question is raised as to why the
Court of Criminal Appeals decided that the amendment must operate
retroactively. It is true that a sentence of death should be carefully
examined to ensure that such a drastic and final sentence be imposed
judiciously and with utmost care. However, such an examination
should not result in a decision to vacate the death sentence when that
decision violates constitutional provisions and ignores obvious legisla-
tive intent.
With the possible exception of a statute which is deemed uncon-
stitutional, there is little justification for retroactive application of a
202. See Gibbons, supra note 200, at 67.
203. Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 740 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
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criminal enactment, whether the enactment creates a new statute, or
amends or repeals an existing one. Retroactive application creates
many problems, particularly those involving the degree of retroactiv-
ity. Even the United States Supreme Court has been unable to estab-
lish rules for retroactivity which can be applied to new cases in a
uniform and just manner. In the absence of such rules, each court is
free to decide on its own whether to apply an enactment retroactively
and, if so, how far back in time it should be applied. This freedom
inevitably leads to unequal treatment and prevents certainty and uni-
form application of the law.
Perhaps a court, when considering retroactive application of a
criminal statute, should engage in a balancing test such as is used in
cases of negligence or nuisance. 2°4 The court could balance the social
utility of retroactive application against the harm done if retroactively
applied. At the very least, such a test would force the court to con-
sider the consequences of retroactive application, and perhaps con-
clude that retroactivity of criminal laws, unless required for protection
of fundamental rights, is not an adequate solution.
However, the simplest solution is to follow the general rule of
prospective application only. The simple, but effective, rule that the
statute in effect at the time of the crime controls the case from its
inception through final appeal avoids the problems inherent in retro-
activity, comports with constitutional provisions, and is one which can
be relied upon by courts in any jurisdiction. The stability provided by
such a rule is essential to efficient operation of the judiciary and, if
strictly followed, could significantly lessen public dissatisfaction with
the legal system by eliminating many retrials and resentencing pro-
ceedings, and thereby hastening the finalization of criminal
adjudications.
Mark A. Ihrig
204. To determine whether an actor has been negligent, an evaluation of the unreasonable-
ness of his actions is performed by balancing the risk of harm to another against the utility of the
act. JAmrs A. HENDERSON, JR., & RicHARD N. PEARSON, Ti TORTS PROCESS 338 (3d ed.
1988). Intentional nuisance problems involve a similar evaluation of the unreasonableness of
action by balancing the gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct. Id. at 920.
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